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the conflict, as opposed to focusing
on how America fought. Moyn then
traces a shift toward the end of the war,
particularly Telford Taylor’s trenchant
criticism of American warfighting
practices, which Taylor came to view
as unlawful. By contrast, Moyn argues
that criticism of our modern conflicts is
directed at the conduct of hostilities—
torture, rules of engagement, and war
crimes. He ascribes this to the end of
conscription and the relative inoculation
of much of the American public from
the effects of our wars abroad, but also
to a larger shift in the broad discourse
about the law of war in the modern era,
in which the means and methods of
warfare are much more tightly regulated.
The final essay builds to some extent on
Moyn’s work, though Larry May’s “War
Crimes Trials during and after War” is
less cogent and ultimately less valuable. May sets out to examine whether
war crimes trials are best prosecuted
while hostilities are still under way or
after hostilities are concluded. Controversially, May argues that war crimes
trials during hostilities ought to address
jus ad bellum matters: once a tribunal
finds that unlawful “aggressive war” is
being waged, soldiers of that side are
on notice that they may be participants
in the war crime of aggression. This
strikes the reviewer as highly implausible, and for that reason this essay
is perhaps the weakest of the five.
Ultimately, Law and War is a collection of essays that are largely conceptual and highly normative in their
arguments. As such it is undoubtedly
a thought-provoking and challenging
book, but also one that is not likely to
be of immediate use to military lawyers
per se. On the other hand, for nonlawyers who ponder the role of law in
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war, in policy making, and in shaping and reflecting societal norms, the
book offers many valuable insights.
JOHN MERRIAM

Daddis, Gregory. Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam. Oxford, U.K.:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 320pp. $36.95

General William Westmoreland, the
American commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV)
from 1964 through 1968, remains one of
the most contentious personalities of the
Vietnam War, still the subject of intense
debate among veterans and historians
of the war. Prevalent still is the view
that “Westy” could not see the forest for
the trees, or vice versa, and disastrously
lacked strategic vision and operational
creativity owing to his parochial focus
on employing Cold War “big unit”
doctrine and attrition to combat an
insurgent war of unification. The most
extreme of such assessments of West
moreland comes from Lewis Sorley, who
in multiple works, notably Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam
(Houghton Mifflin, 2011), all but charges
Westmoreland with gross negligence.
Gregory Daddis, formerly of the Military
History Department at West Point and
now associate professor of history at
Chapman University, offers what he
believes is a more balanced view of this
controversial general. In Westmoreland’s War, Daddis argues that instead
of lacking understanding of the conflict in Vietnam and warmly wrapping
himself in the comfort of familiar “big
unit” doctrine, Westmoreland embraced counterinsurgency approaches
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and pacification, strongly supported
building up the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam (ARVN), and recognized
the importance of establishing the
political legitimacy of the government
of the Republic of Vietnam among the
South Vietnamese people. Far from
the bumbling, career-climbing martinet characterized by Sorley, Daddis’s
Westmoreland at least asserted an intellectual understanding of the challenges
of revolutionary warfare. Daddis argues
that Westmoreland recognized the need
for pacification and other counterinsurgency measures, but failed to articulate
his strategy publicly or to his commanders in the field, ending up conducting
what was in essence an unwinnable war.
Daddis offers a challenging corrective on
Westmoreland, but some will find that
his ideas fall a bit short. What West
moreland said and wrote, which Daddis
ably reveals through his extensive and
valuable archival research, does not connect to what happened on the battlefield.
Westmoreland could not militarily rectify the political problems of South Vietnam, and, as both the military and political situations continued to deteriorate,
Westmoreland in turn relied more on
big-unit search and destroy operations
and the massive firepower the American
military had at its disposal. The military
situation, arguably, dictated that Westmoreland use his limited resources—yes,
limited resources—to stem the tide
on the military side at the expense of
manpower and resources for pacification
and other nonkinetic programs. Attrition, whether Westmoreland intended
it or not (Daddis argues not), was the
public face of his strategic and operational approach throughout his tenure
as commander of MACV. If that was
indeed the case, then Westmoreland’s
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failure is in part one of miscommunicating what it was he believed he was doing
in South Vietnam, if not disconnecting
that belief through intent or ignorance
from the military reality his forces
faced, especially from 1966 forward.
Vietnam was not Westmoreland’s war.
Yes, Westmoreland has been and probably will continue to be the face of that
conflict. He is, after all, an easy if not
agreeable target on which to place a
great deal of blame for the American
debacle. However, as Daddis correctly
points out, the Johnson administration,
not Westmoreland, placed limitations on
what Westmoreland could do in Vietnam. Political leaders in Washington,
like the military leader Westmoreland,
eagerly accepted the primacy of American firepower as a military solution to
both military and political problems in
South Vietnam. Still, one must accept
that the officials of the Johnson administration grounded those limitations in
deep political earth. At the time, they
believed they had good reasons for approaching the conflict the way they did.
Ultimately, as Daddis suggests, it did not
matter what those in Washington, Saigon, or MACV did. The war in Vietnam
was a bad war that American leadership
believed had to be fought nonetheless,
resulting in defeat and tragedy that still
haunts the United States fifty years later.
Westmoreland’s War is an important
book. Scholars of the conflict should
read it. Daddis offers thought-provoking
arguments that counter the Sorley
school on the Westmoreland years of
American involvement in Vietnam.
Whether one agrees with Daddis (or
Sorley for that matter), diligent scholars
must consider Daddis’s point of view
and his interpretation of the archival
evidence. Daddis has made a valuable
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contribution to the discussion, just
as he did with his similarly provocative No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S.
Army Effectiveness and Progress in the
Vietnam War (Oxford, 2011). As for
Westmoreland, the debate continues.
WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON

Hill, Christopher. Outpost: Life on the Frontlines
of American Diplomacy. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2014. 448pp. $30

An American diplomat for over three
decades, Christopher Hill’s service
took him all over the globe and into
some of the most challenging circumstances faced by a member of
the Foreign Service. This account of
his unique postings during that dynamic time frame is a vivid reminder
of how much the world has changed.
In his memoir, Outpost: Life on the
Frontlines of American Diplomacy, Hill,
now a dean at the Josef Korbel School of
International Studies at the University
of Denver, traces his rise in the Department of State in a style that is engaging
and lively. His writing is honest and
reflective as he recounts his interactions
with some of the most distinguished
and most notorious individuals to grace
the world stage. Over the course of his
fast-paced narrative, he doesn’t pull any
punches in his assessments of people or
policy decisions and, most importantly,
he shares valuable and candid insights
(both successes and failures) and lessons
learned over his distinguished career.
Prior to his start in the State Department, Hill spent two years in the Peace
Corps. He recalls trying to influence a
local credit union election in Cameroon
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and failing miserably. He learned the
folly of trying to change the behavior
of an entire community. He writes,
“Years later, in the Middle East, in the
Balkans, in Asia, I would see time and
time again systemized efforts on the part
of the United States to pick winners in
situations we understood little about.
Like my efforts at the Tole Tea Estate’s
credit union, they never worked.”
Another key theme that emerges is the
importance of mentoring and how it
enabled Hill to reach his full potential
in the State Department. His early assignments under Lawrence Eagleburger
(later Secretary of State under George H.
W. Bush) in Yugoslavia and Richard Holbrooke (lead negotiator at the Dayton
Peace Accords and later ambassador
to the UN) at the European Bureau
exposed him to two of the best practitioners of statecraft in the U.S. government.
After recounting the great success at
Dayton, Hill transitions his narrative
to the latter part of his career, in which
his record as a Foreign Service officer
is a little more mixed. He describes
the numerous actors, both domestic (politicians and members of the
military) and international, that he
encountered during some of his most
demanding billets. These postings,
as the Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, envoy
to the North Korean nuclear talks for
the Bush administration, and the U.S.
ambassador to Iraq for the Obama
administration, seem to have left Hill
unfulfilled and somewhat frustrated.
He takes both administrations to task
for what he believes was an unhealthy
blend of partisan politics and lack of a
long-term policy vision. Of particular
note is Hill’s withering critique of Vice
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